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Trade Policies and
Food SecurityGlobalization could and should benefit developing countries. But unlike a
rising tide that lifts all boats, large and small, globalization is unequal. It has
fallen far short of its much-ballyhooed potential to help the world’s poorest
people out of poverty. Instead, a combination of policies in both rich and
poor countries creates conditions for the rich to prosper and many of the
poor to fall more deeply into destitution.
Agricultural protectionism in rich countries enables them to skew markets
in their favor. Tariffs and trade barriers routinely exclude developing-country
products. Other non-tariff barriers, such as non-transparent phytosanitary
regulations, present additional impediments to poor farmers seeking to
enter the global marketplace. Instead of distorting the marketplace, rich
nations must pay more than lip service to the ideal of free and fair trade.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the arena to do so internationally.
Public policies in developing countries also harm poor farmers and pro-
ducers, who often lack the basic conditions for prosperity: health, educa-
tion, land, capital, information, and the marketing infrastructure needed to
take advantage of export opportunities. Developing-country governments
can and must change domestic policies on markets, land tenure, research
and extension, and credit to enable smallholder farmers to compete. 
The two feature essays in this year’s annual report examine who must do
what in order for agricultural globalization to work for the poor. Unilateral
measures by one side or the other will help. But only concerted effort by
both developed- and developing-country governments and institutions to
change trade rules, regulations, and practices will enable the very poor to
feed their families and live a better life.
Trade Policies and Food Security
Essays by 
Kevin Watkins and Joachim von Braun (page 1)
and
Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla and Ashok Gulati (page 19)W
hen the current round of World Trade Organization
(WTO) talks was launched at the end of 2001,
northern governments promised to overhaul agricul-
tural trade rules—and their own farm policies.  That commitment
is at the heart of the so-called Doha “development agenda.”
Unfortunately, fine words have been followed by business as
usual.  Disagreements between the agricultural superpowers,
the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU), have
produced the familiar pattern of mutual recrimination and
deadlock at the WTO, potentially jeopardizing the entire round.
And neither protagonist shows any inclination to cut agricultur-
al subsidies at home.  The EU reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of June 2003 was at best a modest
step in the right direction.  
Meanwhile, developing countries have failed to develop the
alliances that might shift the terms of the debate at the WTO.
The Cairns Group (an alliance of agricultural exporting coun-
tries, 3 of which are developed and 14 of which are develop-
TIME TO STOP DUMPING
ON THE WORLD’S POOR
Kevin Watkins and Joachim von Braun
What can governments in rich countries do
about poverty in poor countries, apart from
increasing and improving aid and endorsing
ambitious poverty reduction goals?  
Answer: get serious about reforming their
own farm policies and start dismantling the
agricultural trade restrictions and subsi-













1ing) is seen as a representative of large-scale commercial
exporters, African interests have been particularly neglected,
and India and China continue to wrestle below their weight
class, even though their joint engagement could fundamentally
change the WTO round. At risk of understatement, the crucial
links between agricultural trade, poverty, and food security do
not figure prominently on the WTO agenda.
All of this is bad news for global poverty reduction efforts.
More than three-quarters of the poor in the developing world—
some 900 million people—live in rural areas.  Most are small
farmers.  That is why agricultural growth based on smallholder
producers is one of the most powerful catalysts for poverty
reduction: for every additional $1 generated through agricultur-
al production, economic linkages can add another $3 to the
rural economy.  Support to agriculture in rich countries matters
because it restricts opportunities for the pro-poor rural growth
that northern governments like to endorse at international
meetings. And it matters because the rural poor cannot wait
any longer for meaningful reform.
There is a cruel irony at the heart of the current agricultural
trading system. In rich countries, agriculture represents a small
share of national income and employment, typically less than 2
percent of the total.  By contrast, agriculture accounts for 17
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in middle-income
countries, rising to 35 percent in the poorest countries.
Agricultural exports exceed one-third of the total in almost half
of all developing countries.  Yet industrialized countries
systematically use subsidies to skew the benefits of
agricultural trade in their favor.
It does not automatically follow that northern agricultural policy
reform will create a new, more equitable pattern of
globalization.  In the absence of wider measures taken by
developing-country governments themselves to address the
underlying causes of poverty and inequality, the opportunities










2There are four priorities for developing-country policymakers.
First, developing countries have to reform their own market
and trade policies (see the accompanying essay by Eugenio
Díaz-Bonilla and Ashok Gulati).  Second, rural development
needs to figure more prominently in national budgets.  Third,
more weight has to be attached to improving poor people’s
access to education, health services, and productive assets.
Fourth, countries must provide effective institutions, through
which the poor can articulate their interests. But agricultural
trade reform in rich countries is necessary to create an
enabling environment in which pro-poor domestic reforms can
work—and it is a condition for making globalization work for
the poor.  
The fundamental problem at the heart of the WTO negotiations
is this.  Each year, rich countries spend in excess of US$300
billion in support of agriculture—some six times the amount
they allocate to foreign development assistance.  Most of the
subsidies end up supporting production and generating large
surpluses, which are then dumped on world markets at prices
that bear no relation to production costs. 
3Meanwhile, high tariffs and other trade barriers are used to
keep imports out.  Tariffs on agricultural goods in the EU and
U.S. are four to five times those applied to manufactured
goods, and peaks in excess of 100 percent—for groundnuts in
the U.S. and dairy produce in Europe, for example—are
common.  While the poorest African countries may not be able
to produce an exportable surplus of dairy products, they could
do so for beef, sugar, and cotton.  Beef and sugar, however,
are the most protected products in the EU, even more than
dairy products, and U.S. cotton policy hinders African growth.
Winners and Losers
Who benefits from these policies?  Research by Oxfam has
shown that the distribution of subsidies among farmers in both
Europe and the U.S. is more unequal than the distribution of
income in Brazil, one of the world’s most unequal countries in
terms of income.  The biggest 25 percent of EU subsidy recipi-
ents receive more than 60 percent of all subsidies.  In the U.S.
460 percent of farmers get no support at all, while the biggest 
7 percent account for 50 percent of government payments. 
The large slice of subsidies directed toward sugar and dairy
producers makes up part of this distorted picture.  To make
matters worse, most of the benefits generated through 
agricultural support do not even reach producers: the supports
are capitalized into higher land values and higher input prices.
According to OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development) estimates only 25 percent of price supports
end up as net income gain for farmers. The system results in
unfair distribution and is highly inefficient.  In the long run it
provides false signals to the incoming generation of farmers
and contributes to loss in equity for many.  Furthermore, it
contributes to disarray in world agriculture and to poverty
worldwide.
Whoever wins from the farm subsidy bonanza in rich countries,
it is the developing countries that lose in aggregate, even
though a few may gain with the EU’s “Everything but Arms”
initiative (EBA).  An IFPRI model predicts that an end to rich-
country support in agriculture would generate annual gains of
US$40 billion for developing countries, with Sub-Saharan
Africa, the world’s poorest region, gaining US$3.3 billion.  The
gains result from an increase in exports (especially for Latin
America) and import substitution effects.
Small farmers in developing countries suffer on several counts
from rich-country farm policies.  Northern production subsidies
lower prices for farm produce.  Unable to compete against
subsidized competition, the world’s poorest farmers are often
pushed out of international and even domestic markets.  The
upshot is an agricultural trading system in which success
depends less on comparative advantage than on comparative
access to subsidies.  Small farmers are efficient, innovative,
and potentially competitive, and creatively combine farming
with off-farm work.  But the world’s poorest farmers cannot
















Northern import restrictions and production subsidies help to
explain two features of the world agricultural trading system
left intact under globalization: slow growth and continued
domination by industrialized countries.  Agricultural growth in
developing countries declined to 2.2 percent per year in the
past 10 years, compared to 3.4 percent in the previous
decade. Although agricultural trade has increased in absolute
terms over the past decade, its share in total trade has
dropped to less than 10 percent.  And developing countries
account for about one-third of exports, roughly the same share
of exports as in 1980. 
The structure of agricultural protectionism in rich countries
reinforces unequal globalization.  Within the agricultural sector,
high-value-added goods represent the most dynamic growth
point.  These goods include products such as meat, fruits and
vegetables, and nuts.  Exports for this category of goods are
growing in excess of 8 percent a year—almost four times the
growth rate for the sector as a whole.  But developing coun-
tries seeking access to high-value-added markets face a
daunting array of trade barriers.
Tariff escalation, or duties that rise with each step of process-
ing, is a standard feature of industrialized-country protection-
ism.  In the EU fully processed food products face tariffs
almost twice as high as tariffs in the first stage of processing.
Latin American exporters to the EU face tariffs that are five
times higher for tomato sauces than those levied on fresh
tomatoes.  At the same time, fresh tomatoes may face prohibi-
tive tariffs in the EU during several months of the year to pro-
tect mainly Italian and Spanish producers from Latin America,
and less so from African producers, who benefit from the EU’s
ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) agree-
ment and the EBA. 
6Such practices create disincentives for investment in local pro-
cessing and deny producers in developing countries opportuni-
ties to enter higher-value-added markets, where new jobs
could be created.  Other high-value-added markets are pro-
tected by huge tariff peaks.  Developing countries (other than
ACP and EBA countries) wanting to export beef to Europe face
tariffs of up to 150 percent, while fruit and nut exporters to the
United States face tariffs of 200 percent or more.  And this is
before taking into account the arsenal of non-tariff barriers,
including phytosanitary regulations.  While the protection of
consumer health is clearly a legitimate priority, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that the selective application of health
standards is often directed toward protectionist goals.
The upshot is that many developing-country agricultural
exporters are operating in the least dynamic part of the global
economy—and they are systematically excluded from a larger
stake in higher-value-added trade.  The present pattern of
agricultural trade is thus reinforcing wider inequalities in global-
ization, with attendant implications for poverty. 
Of course, there are those who see restrictions on export
opportunities for developing-country agriculture as a blessing
in disguise.  In recent years EU ministers for agriculture and
some in the anti-globalization movement have joined hands to
warn against the perils of export agriculture, claiming that it
will displace local food production, exacerbate inequalities,
and reinforce poverty in developing countries.  Whether moti-
vated by a concern to defend indefensible farm policies or by
genuine conviction, these siren voices are wrong. The problem
is not agricultural trade per se, but the rules that govern it and
skew the benefits away from poor countries and poor farmers.
Under the right conditions, agricultural exports can act as a
dynamic force for poverty reduction, providing small farmers
with opportunities to generate income, diversify their liveli-








7Central America, small farmers have succeeded in entering
markets for high-value-added fruit and vegetable exports.  And
IFPRI research shows that export agriculture has played a criti-
cal role in reducing rural poverty in Uganda and Vietnam.  Far
from displacing food production, export success in both coun-
tries has gone hand in hand with an increase in output of basic
food staples.
None of this implies that agricultural trade generates automatic
benefits for poverty reduction.  Small farmers—especially
women—often lack access to the land, capital, information,
and marketing infrastructure needed to take advantage of
export opportunities.  In the absence of public policies in
developing countries to overcome these disadvantages—espe-
cially land tenure and credit policies—export growth can mar-
ginalize the poor.  Surely this situation calls for domestic poli-
cies that redistribute opportunities to the poor, rather than
denying the potential benefits of agricultural exports or turning
a blind eye to northern policies that restrict those benefits.
Harvesting the Cotton Subsidy
When it comes to harvesting subsidies, the U.S.’s 25,000 cot-
ton producers are first among equals.  In 2001, government
support to the sector reached about US$3.4 billion—a sum
that exceeds U.S. aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.  Most of this
support is directed toward agricultural corporations operating
capital-intensive, highly mechanized operations on vast com-
mercial estates.  Because the U.S. is the world’s largest
exporter of cotton, accounting for about 40 percent of the
world market, its domestic subsidy programs have global mar-
ket implications. According to the International Cotton Advisory
Committee, these programs artificially lowered world prices by
about one-quarter in 2001.
The losers have included desperately poor farmers in West
Africa.  This is potentially one of the world’s most productive
cotton-producing regions, thanks partly to the high quality
8associated with non-mechanized production.  Over the past
decade production has almost doubled, creating benefits for
household income, agricultural growth, and exports.  An esti-
mated 10 to 11 million people now depend on cotton produc-
tion.  For many households, cotton is the only cash crop.  It is
often grown on small farms jointly with basic food staples,
such as maize.  Not only does cotton production have a major
bearing on household food security, agricultural investment,
and rural wages, in several countries it is the largest source of
export receipts and government revenue. 
African cotton farmers do not figure prominently in debates on
U.S. farm policy.  They ought to.  Using household survey data
on income and expenditure for Benin, IFPRI has simulated the
effect of a 25 percent increase in the world price of cotton,
roughly corresponding to the effect of the elimination of U.S.
subsidies.  The estimates suggest that a price increase of 25
percent would cause the national incidence of poverty in Benin
to decline by 4 percent, enabling 250,000 people to rise above
the poverty line, which, in this context, consigns those who
live below it to hunger.
9West Africa’s experience also highlights tensions between aid
policies on the one side and agricultural trade policies on the
other.  The lower world prices induced by U.S. subsidies are
estimated to have cost the region about US$190 million in
2001, exacerbating foreign debt and balance-of-payment con-
straints.  Much has been made of the debt relief provided
under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.  Yet
Burkina Faso has lost more as a direct consequence of U.S.
cotton subsidies than it receives in debt relief. And Mali’s loss-
es dwarf American aid to the country.   
The Common Agricultural
Policy
In the interest of balance, we must also acknowledge the egre-
gious role of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  The
EU likes to defend its record by pointing out that, on a per
capita basis, American farmers get more subsidies.  On the
other side of the coin, it should be pointed out that the
US$104 billion in producer support provided by Europe
accounts for one-third of the value of output, compared with
one-fifth in the United States.
10Transatlantic rivalries aside, there is no doubt that on aggre-
gate the CAP hurts poor farmers.  Take the sugar sector.  By
world standards Europe is an exceptionally high-cost producer
of sugar.  It is also the world’s largest exporter of white sugar,
accounting for 40 percent of the global market.  Under the
CAP, farmers in Europe receive a guaranteed price that is typi-
cally two to three times the world market price.  Some devel-
oping countries in the ACP group—notably Mauritius—also
benefit from this price for a fixed quota of exports under a sys-
tem of trade preferences.  Imports are kept out through tariffs
in excess of 140 percent. The high margins provided by guar-
anteed prices support levels of production far in excess of
domestic demand—hence the large exports. 
Subsidized EU exports, stimulation of domestic production,
and taxation of domestic consumption hurt non-subsidizing,
developing-country exporters, forcing countries such as
Malawi, Thailand, and Zambia out of third markets. CAP
exports also lower world sugar prices by around 15 percent. 
In 2001 Europe announced the EBA initiative, aimed at remov-
ing all import barriers for developing countries. But sugar—
along with rice and bananas—was put on the back burner. The
reason: vigorous lobbying by assorted sugar-processing and
big-farm interests. Developing countries will either have to
grow other crops or will continue to lose, as world prices for
sugar remain lower than under non-protectionist policies. The
EBA initiative is positive because it will force EU policies to
change, but the situation would be better if EU policies had
changed beforehand. 
Hopes that CAP reform would usher in a new approach to
agricultural trade by the EU were dashed by the reforms of
June 2003. The European Commission had proposed real
decoupling, aimed at reducing market-based incentives to pro-
duce. However, at the end of the process of member-state
wrangling, decoupling has been only partially introduced in
cereals, but countries can delay this until 2007. Sectors such
as sugar and dairy that account for the bulk of export subsi-
dies are either untouched or subject to only modest reforms.
11Meanwhile, overall levels of subsidy spending will probably
continue to rise until 2013. 
Implications for Food
Importers
For countries that are net food importers, standard consumer
welfare models register the lower food prices associated with
northern production subsidies and export dumping as a posi-
tive gain.  This situation raises an important policy question
that has figured prominently in debates at the WTO: namely,
would an end to export dumping by rich countries hurt food
security in developing countries?
The answer is no.  Standard consumer welfare models tend to
obscure the damage caused by agricultural dumping.  Export
subsidies in industrialized countries undermine incentives for
small farmers in developing countries, and destabilize local
markets. These subsidies raise important questions for policy-
makers in developing countries, notably with regard to import
liberalization.
In India, surges in imports of dairy products forced the govern-
ment to sharply increase tariffs at the end of the 1990s.  Some
critical voices saw the move as a retreat from free trade.  But
what does free trade mean in a context where the world’s
largest exporter of dairy produce, the EU, is providing subsi-
dies in excess of US$3 billion a year?
Under prevailing market conditions, rapid import liberalization
can inflict enormous adjustment costs on small farmers.  When
Haiti opened up its rice market in 1995, imports from the U.S.
flooded in, driving prices down by 25 percent and displacing
local farmers.  At the time agricultural subsidies to U.S. rice
producers represented 40 percent of the value of output.
Without fundamental reform of northern agricultural support
systems, import liberalization will remain a prescription for














12farmers whose livelihoods partly depend on maize production
are currently being integrated into a regional market with the
United States, whose maize farmers benefit from support 
estimated at US$9 billion a year, according to the OECD.
Given the dilapidated state of the infrastructure supporting
Mexican maize farmers, especially in rain-fed areas, the 
unbalanced competition would appear likely to reinforce rural
poverty and migration.
While developing countries may suffer from opening their mar-
kets to cheap imports, they also lose from keeping their mar-
kets closed.  IFPRI research on African markets has shown
that the indirect effects of protectionism in undermining the
very creation and growth of market institutions, including those
related to financing and banking in rural areas, have adverse
long-term consequences for development.
Among the most serious problems associated with northern
export dumping is the signal it has sent to governments in
developing countries, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The
ready availability of cheap food for urban populations has 
13provided a rationale for failing to give priority to the economic
setting in which small farmers operate and for neglecting rural
infrastructure.  In fact, public investment in agriculture and
rural development had fallen off the agenda of ministries of
finance, despite the developmental payoffs.  Only recently has
it been given higher priority by donors, such as the World
Bank, once the detrimental effects of its neglect had become
clear. 
One consequence of falling agricultural investment has been
the dangerously high level of dependence on food aid and
commercial imports witnessed in many countries.  Of course,
these countries should not seek food self-sufficiency for its
own sake, but instead seek food security.  A central challenge
for these countries, and for much of Africa, is to increase
smallholder production of food, not just to reduce foreign
exchange costs, but also to generate income and employment.
Northern export subsidies make this task less attractive.
14The Way Ahead
The Doha “development round” provides a critical opportunity
to start making agricultural trade work for the poor—and
to chart a new course toward a more equitable pattern of
globalization.  Seizing that opportunity is vital, not just in the
interest of small farmers in developing countries, but also in
the interest of restoring the credibility of the rules-based multi-
lateral trading system. 
Five things need to happen to turn the pleasant words of the
Doha Declaration into action.
First, we need an honest assessment of what has happened
under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) adopted at the end
of the last round of world trade talks, the Uruguay Round.
And what has happened is not encouraging. Under the AoA
industrialized countries promised to cut agricultural support by
20 percent.  The pattern of subsidies has somewhat changed
from subsidies tied to production to those that are partly
decoupled.  The June 2003 reform of the EU CAP promises to
go further in the right direction.  Much will depend, however,
on actual implementation of the stated policies, because 
“coupled elements of payments may be maintained to avoid
abandonment of production,” as the EU deal states.
Developing-country small farmers cannot even dream of such
policy stipulations for themselves.
Broadly speaking, there has been a diminishing use of policy
instruments that reward farmers for what they produce with
price supports (defined by the WTO as “trade-distorting”).
Although there is no question that some subsidies distort trade
more than others, nominally decoupled supports often help
sustain production capacities. Producer support estimates
(PSEs), which include both types of subsidies (coupled and
decoupled), have actually increased under the AoA, as meas-








AoAHow has this been possible?  The European Union and the
United States have invented a category of support—known as
the Green Box and the Blue Box in WTO talks—deemed to be
decoupled from production and therefore exempt from cuts in
subsidies.  In effect, they have shifted their support channels
through an elaborate repackaging exercise.  Blue box meas-
ures were allowed only because the EU had lowered grain
prices by 30 percent and had instituted measures to curtail
production (set-aside).  Blue-box payments are related to land,
and to the number of cows for beef production.  Subsidies for
beef production were introduced at a time when beef prices
were lowered.  Nevertheless, this category of subsidies should
be forbidden.  These subsidies might have been justified at the
time of the price cuts in order to provide some adjustment aid.
But such adjustments are not needed for long.
Take the case of EU cereals.  Currently, wheat producers
receive a direct payment equivalent to about US$60 per metric
ton, or some 60 percent of the export price.  Under WTO rules
this payment does not count either as a production subsidy or
as an export subsidy.  The reason: it is classified as a “decou-
pled” payment because it is not coupled to current production.
This rationale might make sense to trade lawyers and account-
ants.  But food staple producers in West Africa trying to com-
pete against EU imports might take a less benign view.  It is
vital that the Doha Round deliver real decoupling and real cuts
in all support measures that create unfair competition.
Second, the Doha Round must deliver a comprehensive prohi-
bition against export support measures that act directly or indi-
rectly as export subsidies.  Farmers in developing countries
need rules that outlaw the export of agricultural goods at
prices below those received by producers.  Those rules must
extend beyond direct export subsidies to cover the full range
of measures currently in place.  These include:
• direct payments for commodities in surplus, such as EU










16• export credit programs, such as the US$5.7 billion in official-
ly supported export credit provided under the 2002 U.S.
Farm Act; and
• food aid programs used to indirectly cofinance commercial
exports.
In this round donors must make a credible commitment to ade-
quate levels of food aid, delivered in non-distorting ways, effec-
tively reaching the needy, and responding swiftly to emergencies.
Third, rich countries need to open their own markets.  As the
president of Brazil, Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva, has written:
“Any export efforts we might make will be worth nothing if the
rich countries continue to preach free trade and practice pro-
tectionism.” One of the aims of the Doha Round should be an
“early harvest” of measures to lower tariff and nontariff barriers
on agricultural goods and to eliminate tariff escalation.
Fourth, developing countries must retain the right to protect
their agricultural systems from instability and unfair competition
associated with northern agricultural subsidies.  Developing
countries themselves have put forward proposals in this area.
For example, the Government of India has advocated a “spe-
cial safeguard” provision under which higher tariffs would be
triggered if import prices fall below specified levels. 
For their part, the EU and the U.S. have resisted calls for
entrenched rights to protect food security, arguing that any
safeguards should be limited to a narrow range of “food sta-
ples” and a small group of countries.  This is a particularly
hypocritical way of thinking about food security.  Protection of
the livelihoods of small farmers cannot be reduced to a small
range of food crops. 
Fifth, while the largest benefits of agricultural liberalization
would arise from multilateral negotiations under WTO, regional
and bilateral negotiations of free trade agreements (FTAs) are













17the WTO process, but they also endanger progress at the
global level, if continued in an erratic fashion.  For the time
being, Europe and the United States should hold back on fur-
ther bilateral FTAs and fully concentrate on achieving progress
in the WTO negotiations.
These five actions will help establish a more equitable system
of international trade that is not rigged against small farmers in
developing countries.  By ending the self-serving instincts that
currently dictate their approach to agricultural trade, rich coun-
tries can help to create an enabling environment for poor farm-
ers.  Then it is up to developing-country governments them-
selves to create the conditions under which their people can
exploit trade opportunities to reduce poverty and hunger.
Under these conditions international development finance
would have a greater, more beneficial impact as well.
Kevin Watkins is head of research at Oxfam. Joachim von












n spite of its importance, agricultural growth in developing
countries has been hampered over the years by a series of
factors. First, as developing countries sought to industrialize
their economies, they usually taxed agriculture.  The bias
against agriculture in developing countries also hurt the poor,
who often depended heavily on that sector for income and
employment.  Although several developing countries have
reduced or even eliminated that policy bias since the early
1990s, another negative factor has become increasingly
apparent: the subsidization of agriculture in rich countries.
During the 1980s these subsidies led to surpluses that rich
countries disposed of on world markets with the heavy use of
export subsidies. The combination of agricultural protectionism
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND
THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS
Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla and Ashok Gulati
A dynamic agricultural sector is crucial
for economic growth, poverty alleviation,
and food security in developing countries.
Although primary agricultural activities
are declining over time as a share of the
economy, they still represent about one-
fourth of total economic activity and 60
percent of total employment in low-income
developing countries. Primary and
processed food products account for about
20 percent of these countries’ merchandise
trade.  Moreover, of the 1.2 billion people
living on less than US$1 a day, about 75
percent live and work in rural areas in
developing countries.
19and subsidies in industrialized countries has limited agricultural
growth in the developing world, increasing poverty and weak-
ening food security in vulnerable countries. Those policies have
also hurt the rich countries themselves through higher food
costs and a larger tax burden on citizens. And rich countries'
claim that the expected benefits of their agricultural policies, in
terms of safer food, a cleaner environment, and better income
distribution, are larger than the costs rings false, given recent
food scares like "mad cow disease" in Europe, the environ-
mental pollution linked to agriculture in industrialized countries,
and the fact that most transfers go to large farmers.
An Opportunity to Level the
Playing Field
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations initiated the process
of bringing agricultural policies under a common set of rules, in
an attempt to reduce the negative impact of prevailing prac-
tices on world welfare. But the reform process is far from com-
plete. Like the textile industry (another sector in which devel-
oping countries have a comparative advantage), agriculture
continues to receive separate treatment under the new World
Trade Organization (WTO) framework. This framework allows
the artificial expansion of agricultural production in industrial-
ized countries, while limiting the potential expansion of agricul-
ture in developing countries.  Some have sarcastically called
this separate treatment of agriculture and textiles “special and
differential treatment” for the rich countries.  The Doha Round
offers the opportunity to level a tilted playing field. To do that,
the negotiations will have to complete the unfinished business
of the Uruguay Round in reducing protectionism and subsidies,
particularly in rich countries, while at the same time consider-
ing the needs of vulnerable countries and groups.  
In the Doha Round negotiations, developing countries have
been following two basic approaches to varying degrees. One
is to “play offense” by trying to limit the ample legal room











20dize and protect their own agriculture (for which they also have
large financial resources). The other is to “play defense”by ask-
ing for additional exemptions (that is, “special and differential
treatment”) to be able to subsidize and protect agriculture in
developing countries. The combination of offensive and defen-
sive tactics varies by country and partly reflects the hetero-
geneity of developing countries in general and of their agricul-
ture sectors in particular.
The Varied Interests of
Developing Countries
The differences among developing countries and their agricul-
ture sectors manifest themselves at several levels.  Africa and
Latin America and the Caribbean, for instance, have more
available arable land per capita than Asian developing coun-
tries, but land appears to be distributed more unequally in
Latin America and the Caribbean.  Asia and Latin America and
the Caribbean, however, have better infrastructure than Africa.
Although all developing regions have experienced increases in
21trade of fruits and vegetables, Asia and Latin America and the
Caribbean have been more dynamic oilseed exporters.  Africa
has been losing export market share in world agricultural mar-
kets. Latin America and the Caribbean is a net agricultural
exporter, Asia became a net importer in the early 1970s, and
Africa, which had a strong positive agricultural balance in the
1960s and 1970s, has experienced deficits since the early
1980s.  The direction of trade also varies.  Asian countries
trade mainly within the region; Latin American and Caribbean
countries trade with Europe, the United States, and other
countries within the region; and Africa trades mostly with
Europe.  
An IFPRI study using cluster analysis also showed the large
differences in food security status among developing coun-
tries.   Those countries appear scattered across nearly all lev-
els of food security and insecurity, although none appear in the
very high food-secure group. Among food-insecure countries,
the profiles also differ: some are predominantly rural (mostly in
Africa and South Asia) whereas for others the urban population
is more important (like many countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean and in transition economies).   Obviously the same
policy (such as maintaining high prices for producers) will have
different impacts in these two types of countries. 
Some countries are food insecure mostly because of low levels
of calories and proteins per capita, although they do not use
large percentages of their exports to buy food. In the terminol-
ogy of the study, these countries are “consumption vulnerable”
but not “trade stressed.”  Other food-insecure countries are a
mirror image: they appear trade stressed (using a large per-
centage of their exports to buy food) but less consumption vul-
nerable (their current levels of calories and proteins per capita
are close to the average for all countries considered). Again,
the policy options for these two types of countries are differ-
ent: the first group may increase imports to improve availability
of calories and proteins, whereas increasing imports may not















22The different positions taken by developing countries in the
Doha Round negotiations reflect this heterogeneity.  The
Cairns Group (an alliance of agricultural exporting countries
that includes 3 developed-country and 14 developing-country
members) has mainly emphasized playing offense.  It is inter-
esting to note that, although the Cairns Group is usually per-
ceived as encompassing countries that are large commercial
exporters, in fact 3 countries in this group are in food-insecure
clusters.  Other developing countries have emphasized a
defensive approach advocating additional levels of support and
protection for developing countries (such as the 11 WTO mem-
bers, including Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, and others, that presented those proposals under the
general name of a “Development Box”) while also asking for a
reduction in subsidies and protection in industrialized coun-
tries.  Still other countries are trying to coordinate both
approaches. India is an interesting case. On the one hand,
playing offense seems reasonable for a country that in the past
few years has emerged as one of the world’s top net exporters
of agricultural products. On the other hand, a large percentage
of India’s poor population lives in rural areas. Concerns about
possible negative impacts on the rural poor have therefore
underpinned the defensive components in India’s WTO propos-
al, embedded in the notion of a Food Security Box (with pro-
posals for additional levels of support and protection compara-
ble to the Development Box).
Acknowledging that heterogeneity, we may still make some
general points. As indicated, a dynamic agricultural sector is
crucial in developing countries, particularly the poorest ones,
and research has shown that agricultural exports appear to be
associated with higher levels of growth. Higher growth, if it is
broad based and stable, in turn helps reduce poverty.
Conversely, closed economies relying on the dynamics of small
domestic markets tend to show slower and more halting
growth rates. If countries follow their comparative advantage,
international trade by labor-abundant, poor developing coun-













23To the extent that poverty is the main cause of food insecurity,
international trade opportunities should also help improve food
security. The expansion of trade in goods and services over
the past decades, along with the decline in food prices result-
ing from technological advances, has led to sharp reductions
in the size of the total food bill of developing countries as a
share of total export earnings. 
Of course, differences in agrifood production and export per-
formance by developing countries depend on several factors,
such as income and population growth, natural resource base
and climate, and technological progress. But economic poli-
cies, in both industrialized and developing countries, also have
a major impact. The WTO legal framework and the current
negotiations are crucial precisely because of their likely effects
on trade and agricultural policies worldwide. When considering
negotiating positions from the point of view of the developing
countries, it is important to analyze their policies separately
from those of the industrialized countries.
24The Price of Agricultural
Protectionism
Since the 1970s various studies have tried to quantify the
impact that agricultural protectionism in industrialized countries
has had on the world. Those studies have consistently report-
ed that agricultural surpluses in rich countries, generated
through protection and subsidies and then dumped onto world
markets, have hurt agricultural development in developing
countries.  Recent simulations by IFPRI show that those poli-
cies by industrialized countries have displaced about US$40
billion in net agricultural exports per year from developing
countries and reduced agricultural incomes in those countries
by nearly US$30 billion (counting both primary and manufac-
tured agricultural products but not related activities such as
trade, commerce, and other services).  Moreover, these esti-
mates may be low because they do not include dynamic
effects from additional investments that better market opportu-
nities may elicit or second-round multiplier effects from those
agricultural incomes that never materialized.  More than half of
these displacement effects have resulted from the policies of
the European Union (and other European countries such as
Norway and Switzerland), somewhat less than a third from
U.S. policies, and about 10 percent mainly from Japanese poli-
cies, with the balance resulting from the policies of other
industrialized countries.
These results should give some pause to the proponents of
“multifunctionality” in rich countries who argue that agriculture
has additional benefits for their societies, and that, therefore, it
must be protected and subsidized. But an important effect of
those policies is that agriculture in many poor countries is
forced to contract. So whose multifunctionality is being
advanced, and whose is being trampled upon?  The losses
resulting from the displaced production are particularly damag-
ing in the many low-income countries whose economies
depend heavily on agriculture and agroindustrial production
and where most poverty occurs in rural areas. 
25Current WTO negotiations must complete the unfinished busi-
ness of correcting those imbalances to allow broad-based eco-
nomic growth in developing countries. In addition to the obvious
and compelling humanitarian arguments, enlightened self-inter-
est also dictates that developed countries combat hunger and
poverty: poor, developing countries continue to spawn health,
environmental, military, and humanitarian crises worldwide that
directly or indirectly impact developed countries, while poverty
and hunger deprive the world of the creative potential and eco-
nomic contribution of billions of human beings.
Three Challenges to
Liberalization
Three concerns have been raised against the general proposi-
tion that the imbalances in trade rules must be corrected.
First, it has been pointed out that liberalizing agricultural poli-
cies in the industrialized countries may increase the food bill of
developing countries that are net food importers.  Although the
agricultural policies of the rich countries have hurt developing
countries that are net exporters, this argument suggests that
those same policies  may have helped the balance of pay-
ments position of developing countries that are net importers
of the same products.  Second, for those developing countries
that have preferential access to the protected markets of rich
countries, the liberalization of trade in those markets may lead
to the erosion of trade preferences (that is, by having access
to a protected market those countries can sell at prices higher
than those prevailing in world markets).  Finally, some have
argued that by expanding their exports, developing countries
may worsen poverty and food security because export crops
may compete with staple crops and through other mechanisms
may affect the poor and women unfavorably.  
The first argument, however, omits the differences in distribu-
tional impact within developing countries between consumers
and producers and across various types of households.






26may have had a stifling effect on agricultural and agroindustrial
production in all developing countries, regardless of their net
trade position. Given that these sectors are the main economic
activities in many developing countries, particularly poor ones,
and that growth in these sectors is usually multiplied through-
out the whole economy, poor developing countries, even net
importers, may have lost a substantial source of dynamic ben-
efits. In fact depressed world prices of many food products
caused by agricultural protectionism and subsidies in industri-
alized countries may have contributed to some developing
countries’ becoming net food importers, pushing them into a
more extreme specialization in tropical products. 
A welfare-enhancing approach would be to proceed with the
liberalization of markets in rich countries while offering cash
grants or other financial schemes to help poor countries with
possible balance-of-payment problems. The analysis of the
possible impact on the balance of payments must be conduct-
ed considering the entire economy in a general equilibrium con-
text, because even if agricultural prices rise, the negotiations
27may have other price and volume effects on exports and
imports that compensate for agricultural price effects.  
The second point focuses on the possible erosion of prefer-
ences for a number of developing countries that have special
market access arrangements with industrialized countries.  For
low-income developing countries, such preferential access
usually represents a large percentage of agricultural exports
and sectoral value-added and has important implications for
rural employment and the balance of payments.  Yet, it is not
clear how much countries with access to rich countries’ mar-
kets benefit from the current arrangements, considering that
the specific mechanisms for operating those preferences may
have high administrative costs, may be uncertain over time,
and may tilt the distribution of benefits toward domestic
importers and away from the exporting developing countries.
Several options offer greater benefits in national welfare terms
than maintaining current levels of protection in rich countries.
In some cases, changing the way tariff rate quotas operate
could compensate for the erosion of preferences in the short
run.  One possibility would be to grant import licenses to the
28exporting countries instead of giving them to domestic import-
ing companies and to reduce to zero the “in quota” tariff for
those exporting countries.  This approach would transfer the
complete quota rent (that is, the difference between the higher
domestic price and the lower world price) to the exporting
developing countries.
Another possibility is to transform the equivalent value of the
trade preferences lost into foreign aid. This approach would
mean extending to the affected poor developing countries the
same logic applied when industrialized countries compensate
domestic producers for the reduction in direct support.  These
lost preferences should also be calculated considering the
economy-wide impact as a whole. 
The third question is linked to earlier criticisms of the Green
Revolution, later extended to commercialization and interna-
tional trade. It has been argued first that the limited resources
of small farmers could prevent them from participating in
expanding markets and lead to worsening income distribution.
Second, and more worrisome, if relative prices shift against the
poor or if the power of already dominant actors (large
landowners, big commercial enterprises) is reinforced to allow
them to extract income from the poor or to appropriate their
assets, the poor could become worse off in absolute terms. It
has also been argued that food security could decrease if cash
crops or export production displace staple crops and if these
changes result in women having less decisionmaking power
and fewer resources. 
Yet several studies have shown that the Green Revolution—
and domestic and international commercialization—can and
did yield benefits for the poor because of its effect on produc-
tion, employment, and food prices, although any uniform
attainment of benefits is by no means guaranteed. Trade
expansion that creates income opportunities for women may
also give them greater control over expenditures, with positive
effects on child nutrition and development, as well as greater
29incentives to invest in girls. But there may be a trade-off
between income-generating activities and the time allocated
for childcare—an issue currently being analyzed at IFPRI.
Generally, developing countries need to pursue complementary
policies that will increase the physical and human capital
owned by the poor and by women, build general infrastructure
and services, ensure that markets operate competitively, build
effective safety nets, and eliminate institutional, political, and
social biases that discriminate against vulnerable groups. 
Policy Options for Developing
Countries
Although eliminating welfare-reducing policies in rich countries
should be paramount in these negotiations, at the same time
developing countries need to carefully consider their own agri-
cultural policies. For years many of them have discriminated
against agriculture, and although the most obvious macroeco-
nomic biases may be gone, many countries still do not invest
enough in agriculture and rural development. 
Several developing countries have expressed concern that 
further trade liberalization could create problems for their large
and predominantly poor agricultural populations. Poor coun-
tries have argued for a slower pace in reducing their own 
tariffs on the premise that industrialized countries should first
eliminate their higher levels of protection and subsidization. 
A related concern has been how to protect the livelihoods of
poor producers from sudden negative impacts resulting from
unfair trade practices such as subsidized exports and from
import surges.
While insisting on a rigid sequence in which developed coun-
tries first eliminate all their own distortions seems a sure recipe
for stalemate, developing countries seem justified in asking for
significant down payments in the reduction of protection and
subsidies in industrialized countries. Also, food-insecure and
vulnerable countries need (1) longer transition times that must







30alleviation strategies, and (2) simplified and streamlined instru-
ments to confront unfair trade practices and import surges that
may irreparably damage the livelihoods of small farmers.  In
particular, in the context of the negotiations it is important to
clarify the possible use by developing countries of other trade
remedies against domestic and, especially, export subsidies of
industrialized countries. 
Some observers, however, have argued for maintaining high lev-
els of agricultural protection in developing countries, or even
increasing it further, as a way of reducing poverty and promot-
ing food security.  Sometimes this suggestion is accompanied
by the argument that protection “does not cost money” and is
easier to implement than subsidies in poor countries. Yet con-
trary to the common perception that protection is a tax paid by
foreigners and collected by governments, much of the implicit
tax is paid by domestic consumers and collected privately by
producers in the form of higher prices. This tax on food has an
obvious negative impact on poor households, which in many
developing countries spend more than half of their income on
food, and is mainly received by bigger agricultural producers
with larger quantities of products to sell. Landless rural work-
31ers, poor urban households, and many poor small farmers
tend to be net buyers of food. The problems faced by poor
farmers and poor consumers are better addressed through
policies and investments targeted to them directly. The focus
should therefore be on vulnerable groups rather than on crops.
The best approach for developing countries is to eliminate
biases against the agricultural sector in their general policy
framework and to maintain a neutral trade policy that reduces
protection over time. They should use transition periods nego-
tiated in the WTO to increase investments in human capital,
land tenure, water access, technology, infrastructure, nonagri-
cultural rural enterprises, organizations of small farmers, and
other forms of social capital and political participation for the
poor and vulnerable. None of these policies is constrained
under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. The claims that
more protection is necessary to shelter small farmers would
ring hollow if the current underinvestment in rural development
and poverty alleviation in developing countries continues.
More investments targeted to the poor and vulnerable also
require additional financial resources from the international
community. Industrialized countries can help by agreeing to
significantly reduce their own protectionism and subsidies in
the current trade negotiations, while simultaneously making
sure there is increased funding by international and bilateral
organizations for rural development, poverty alleviation, and
health and nutrition interventions. At the same time, govern-
ments in developing countries should support macroeconomic
stability, good governance, and peace, if they want to over-
come poverty and hunger. Without addressing these other key
factors, any modification in the WTO agreements will have 
limited benefits.
Eugenio Díaz-Bonilla is a senior research fellow in the
Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division of IFPRI.  Ashok
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